		SIGNED.
1 2		Dated: January 04, 2010
3		A A . I
		Kardoph J. Haines
4 5		RANDOLPH J. HAINES U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
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7	IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	
, 8	FOR THE	E DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
	In re) Chapter 11
9) CASE NO. 2:08-bk-07465-RJH
10	MORTGAGES LTD.,	 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR STAY PENDING
11	Debtor.) APPEAL
12	/	
13	The Trustee of the Liquidating Trust of Mortgages Ltd. has filed a motion for	
14	stay pending appeal of this Court's December 21 money judgment in favor of Radical Bunny	
15	for substantial contribution. The motion is granted in part, by granting a stay of the	
16		0 p.m. Tuesday, January 19, 2010, and is otherwise
17	denied.	
18	This Court's Order of D	ecember 21 found that Radical Bunny made a
19	substantial contribution to this bankrup	tcy case and therefore is entitled to an award of a
20	portion of its costs and attorney's fees. In effect, that December 21 Order is a money	
21	judgment. The Liquidating Trust's motion for stay pending appeal does not, however, seek a	
22	supersedeas stay as of right by posting a supersedeas bond. Nor does it even seek the modified	
23	supersedeas described in Wymer ¹ by pr	oposing some substitute security that would furnish
24	equal protection to the judgment credit	or. Consequently the motion is subject to the normal
25	discretionary stay rules, which include sustaining the burden of demonstrating both a "high	
26	probability of success on appeal and in	reparable injury." ²
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28	¹ <i>In re Wymer</i> , 5 B.R. 802, 806 (9 th	Cir BAP 1980)
	$^{2}Id.$ at 807.	
	<i>i</i> . <i>u</i> 007.	

The motion fails to demonstrate either a probability of success or irreparable injury.

The motion attempts to demonstrate probability of success on appeal by arguing that the Court's findings and ruling are purely legal in nature and that they misapplied the applicable Ninth Circuit legal standard. Both of these arguments fail. First, the Court's finding of substantial contribution is a factual determination reviewable under the "clearly erroneous" standard.³ The Court's findings were not based solely upon the facts stipulated by the parties but also on the Court's extensive experience with the conduct of this bankruptcy case and, most importantly, the negotiation and ultimate confirmation of the plan of reorganization.

More importantly, however, even as to the legal issues involved, the Liquidating
Trust has failed to demonstrate any likelihood of error in this Court's application of the
governing Ninth Circuit law. The motion makes no attempt to demonstrate how this Court's
ruling and interpretation and application of the Ninth Circuit standard are at all contrary to
either the rationale or the holding of the Ninth Circuit in *Cellular 101*.⁴

And the attempt to demonstrate irreparable injury is far weaker. Although the
motion questions whether the Liquidating Trust would be able to recover approximately
\$600,000 from the substantial law firm of DeConcini McDonald Yetwin & Lacy, P.C., the
raising of that question falls far short of demonstrating actual existence of irreparable injury.
And the cost of funds to satisfy the money judgment is classically *not* the form of irreparable
injury that authorizes equity to intervene and supersede legal judgments without a supersedeas
bond.

Finally, the motion for stay does nothing to demonstrate good cause why the Court should depart from the general rule requiring the posting of a supersedeas bond, or some substitute form of adequate protection, to stay the enforcement of a money judgment.

For these reasons, the motion for stay pending appeal is denied except to the

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³*Cellular 101, Inc. v. Channel Communications, Inc.*, 377 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004). ⁴*Id.*

1	extent that the enforceability of this Court's December 21 judgment is stayed until 5:00 p.m.	
2	Tuesday, January 19, 2010.	
3	DATED AND SIGNED ABOVE	
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