Mark J. Dorval 1 Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, LLP 2600 One Commerce Square 2 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Telephone: 215-564-8000 3 Mdorval@Stradlev.com 4 Attorneys for Kevin T. O'Halloran, Trustee of the ML **Liquidating Trust** 5 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 6 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA In re: Proceedings Under Chapter 11 MORTGAGES LTD., an Arizona corporation, Case No. 2:08-bk-07465-RJH 9 Debtor. BRIEF IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF THE 10 ML LIQUIDATING TRUST OBJECTION TO THE APPLICATION PURSUANT TO 11 11 U.S.C.  $\S$  503(b)(3)(D) AND (b)(4) FOR ALLOWANCE AND PAYMENT OF 12 ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIMS OF CREDITOR RADICAL BUNNY, LLC 13 **RE DOCKET NOS. 1888, 2014, 2027,** 14 2088 15 16 Kevin T. O'Halloran, Trustee of the ML Liquidating Trust ("Liquidating Trust"), by and 17 through his counsel Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, LLP, hereby files this Brief in Further 18 Support of his Objection to the Application Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) and (b)(4) for 19 Allowance and Payment of Administrative Claim ("Substantial Contribution Claim") of Creditor 20 Radical Bunny, LLC [Docket No. 1888] ("Claimant" or "RBLLC"). 21 I. **FACTS** 22 Α. Summary 23 RBLLC claims to have made a substantial contribution to the Mortgages, Ltd. 24 ("Debtor" or "ML") estate (the "Estate") and seeks payment of \$595,798.25 from this Estate for its 25 efforts. In reality, all of the work performed by RBLLC was performed to protect RBLLC's \$200 26 million claim in the Debtor's case. Moreover, the work for which RBLLC seeks

compensation was performed in conjunction with numerous other parties, including the Debtor, the

Official Committee of Investors (the "OIC"), and other creditors. As such, these services were

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duplicative of the work being performed by Estate professional (and being paid from the Estate). The Bankruptcy Code does not permit every creditor that participates in a bankruptcy case to be compensated from the Debtor's Estate. To the contrary, only the creditor that makes a substantial contribution is entitled to compensation from the Estate, and RBLLC falls far short of demonstrating that it made any substantial contribution.

Moreover, any benefit that RBLLC might have provided was erased when RBLLC chose to aggressively fight the efforts to confirm the plan of reorganization proposed by the OIC (the "OIC Plan"). The OIC Plan was ultimately confirmed by the Court after the OIC incurred the expense of resolving the RBLLC objection (an expense that was ultimately paid by the Estate). Despite RBLLC's efforts to derail confirmation of the OIC Plan, RBLLC actually seeks an award for substantial contribution relating to its work on the very same OIC Plan that it vigorously opposed until its own treatment under the OIC Plan was improved. Once again, this is hardly the kind of unique situation that rises to the level of a substantial contribution to the entire Estate, as compared to a substantial benefit to RBLLC alone. Therefore, only RBLLC should be responsible for the payment of its own attorneys' fees.

Unfortunately for RBLLC, all of its work was done to protect its own interests and was duplicative of work being performed by Estate professionals. Moreover, RBLLC's efforts to improve its own treatment in the bankruptcy by alternately supporting two different plans and objecting to the OIC Plan removes any possible contribution that RBLLC might have made to the Estate and makes clear that these efforts by RBLLC did not provide any substantial benefit to the Estate.

## B. <u>Background</u>

The Joint Statement of Material Facts of Radical Bunny and Liquidating Trust filed with the Court on or about November 11, 2009 (the "Uncontested Facts"), is incorporated herein by reference.

RBLLC was a creditor of the Debtor in the approximate amount of \$200 million, as a result of certain pre-petition loans advanced from RBLLC to Debtor. *Uncontested Facts* at ¶ 5. While RBLLC claims that the obligations of Debtor to RBLLC were allegedly secured by ML's interest

in loans made to various borrowers, this claim was challenged by several parties, and this Court was never required to determine whether RBLLC was, in fact, a secured creditor prior to confirmation of the plan of reorganization. On October 8, 2008, RBLLC was placed into involuntary bankruptcy by certain of its creditors. *In re Radical Bunny, LLC*, U.S. Bankr. D. Arizona, Case No. 2:08-bk-13884-CGC.

From the inception of the case, RBLLC was active in protecting its \$200 million claim in the ML bankruptcy. Through December 2008, RBLLC worked with the OIC, the Value-to Loan Committee (the "VTL Committee") and other interested parties to help formulate a creditor-sponsored plan of reorganization for ML. *Uncontested Facts* at ¶ 32. However, beginning in January 2009, RBLLC changed its position, abandoned the OIC and other creditors working towards a creditor plan and worked with the Debtor on an opposing plan. *Id.* at ¶¶ 45-47. Ultimately, the OIC proposed the OIC Plan without the support of RBLLC [Docket No. 1468]. *Id.* Although claiming to be entitled to a payment for its substantial contribution to the plan process, RBLLC, actually voted to reject the OIC Plan and filed a 28 page objection to the OIC Plan. *Id.* In spite of RBLLC's efforts to derail the OIC Plan, this Court ultimately confirmed by the OIC Plan.

On July 6, 2009, RBLLC filed its administrative claim, requesting the Debtor's estate to pay \$595,798.25 of the legal fees and costs incurred by RBLLC, alleging that RBLLC made a "substantial contribution" to the Debtor's bankruptcy case through its (i) work relating to the OIC Plan; (ii) alleged preservation of estate assets; and (iii) objections and negotiations regarding certain settlement agreements with Debtor's borrowers. Regardless of RBLLC's opinion of the value of its contribution to the early plan formation process with the OIC and several other constituents, RBLLC ultimately refused to support the OIC Plan, refused to sponsor the OIC Plan, voted to reject the OIC Plan, filed an objection to the OIC Plan and aggressively fought to thwart confirmation of the OIC Plan. *Id.* It is absurd for RBLLC to now claim that it made a substantial contribution to the Estate through its work in the plan process and seek payment from the ML estate for its conflicting efforts. <sup>1</sup>

If the Court were to accept the view of substantial contribution proposed by RBLLC, RBLLC would be entitled to a substantial contribution award regardless of which plan succeeded because RBLLC "helped in formulating" and ultimately supported both proposed plans, depending on which was giving it better treatment for its

The remaining work for which RBLLC seeks an award was performed primarily to protect its \$200 million interest and was duplicative of work performed by other Estate professionals. As is true with RBLLC's work on the plan, none of RBLLC's other actions in this case rise to the legal standard necessary to justify an award of a substantial contribution claim, and RBLLC cannot, therefore, substantiate that this is one of the very rare situations that calls for a creditor's legal fees to be shifted to the Debtor's Estate.

### II. ANALYSIS

#### A. <u>Legal Standard</u>

The party asserting a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) and (b)(4), bears the burden of proof to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that it "provide[d] tangible benefits to the bankruptcy estate and the other secured creditors." *In re Sedona Institute*, 2001 WL 1345985 at \*1 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2001) (citing *In re Catalina Spa & R.V. Resort, Ltd.*, 97 B.R. 13, 17 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989)). RBLLC's counsel has not and cannot meet this burden and is not entitled to payment from this Estate, as opposed to receiving payment from its own client.

Although section 503(b) of the Code is meant to foster participation of creditors in a bankruptcy case, "courts must be sensitive to the danger of mushrooming administrative expenses." *In re American Plumbing & Mechanical, Inc.*, 327 B.R. 273, 279 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005) (citing *In re Alert Holdings, Inc.*, 157 B.R. 753, 757 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)). As a result, bankruptcy courts narrowly construe the availability of substantial contribution awards under § 503(b)(3)(D) and (b)(4) and "*strictly limit compensation to extraordinary creditor actions* which lead directly to significant and tangible benefits to the creditors, debtor or the estate in order to maintain the integrity of § 503(b)." *In re D.W.G.K. Restaurants, Inc.*, 84 B.R. 684, 690 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1988) (emphasis added); *see also, In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc.*, 404 B.R. 488, 493 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) (citing *In re Glickman, Berkowitz, Levinson & Weiner, P.C.*, 196 B.R. 291, 294 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996); *In re Stoecker*, 128 B.R. 205, 208 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991)).

Applications brought pursuant to section 503(b) of the Code shall only be granted on "rare"

claim at that time. This cannot be the standard under § 503(b).

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occasions and in "unusual" circumstances. In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 B.R. 246, 250 (Bankr. D. Col. 1990) (recognizing the "potential ramifications for opening the door to § 503(b)(3) claims too far"); In re Randall's Island Family Golf Centers, Inc., 300 B.R. 590, 598 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (compensation under section 503(b)(3) is only awarded on "rare occasions" and for "extraordinary actions"). Courts recognize that "[c]ompensation cannot be freely given to all creditors who take an active role in bankruptcy proceedings ... [i]t must be preserved for those rare occasions when the creditor's involvement truly fosters and enhances the administration of the estate." D.W.G.K. Restaurants, 84 B.R. at 690; see also, In re Sentinel, 404 B.R. at 499 (claimant providing several terms that were incorporated into the plan did not provide substantial contribution); In re American Plumbing, 327 B.R. at 284 (indenture trustee did not make a substantial contribution through its cost-savings work for the estate or by its objection to the plan); In re Columbia Gas Sys. Inc., 224 B.R. 540 (Bankr. D. Del. 1998) (creditors denied requests for substantial contribution despite their contributions to resolving key issues in confirming a plan of reorganization); In re Geriatrics Nursing Home, Inc., 195 B.R. 34, 38-39 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996) (creditor whose actions led to better treatment of all unsecured creditors in the plan was denied award of substantial contribution).

The substantial contribution claim being made by RBLLC does not fit within the rare occasion or unusual circumstance required. As discussed more fully below, RBLLC was involved in the case primarily to protect its own interests and its efforts were duplicative of other Estate professionals. As a result of the promotion of its own interests and its flip-flopping support and opposition of the competing plans, RBLLC ultimately received preferential treatment in the confirmed OIC Plan as its reward for its efforts. RBLLC chose to engage counsel to protect its \$200 million interest in the ML bankruptcy, and the *RBLLC estate* is responsible for the fees incurred as a result of its decision. RBLLC's counsel expected to be compensated by its client and not by the Debtor – and at no time did the Debtor or any other party suggest that RBLLC's counsel would be compensated from the Debtor's estate. *Uncontested Facts* at ¶¶ 26, 54.

In this Circuit, the principal test for substantial contribution is "the extent of benefit to the estate." *In re Cellular 101, Inc.*, 377 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing *In re Christian Life* 

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Ctr., 821 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987)). As stated by RBLLC, this Court must also consider: (i) the extent that the creditor acted solely for its own benefit; and (ii) whether the creditor's actions were duplicative of those taken by other parties in the bankruptcy case. See In re US Lines, Inc., 103 B.R. 427, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[t]hose services which are provided solely for the client-ascreditor, such as services rendered in prosecuting a creditor's claim are not compensable"); In re Buttes Gas Oil Co., 112 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989) (court must consider whether services were duplicative). Inherent in the term "substantial" is the concept that the benefit received by the estate must be more than an incidental one arising from activities the applicant pursued in protecting its own interests. Sentinel, 404 B.R. at 494 (citing Lebron v. Mechem Fin. Inc., 27 F.3d 937, 944 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also, In re American Plumbing, 327 B.R. at 284 (indenture trustee efforts in plan process were undertaken primarily to protect its own interests); Geriatrics Nursing Home, 195 B.R. at 38-39 (creditor not entitled to substantial contribution award where it acted primarily in its own interest rendering any benefit to the estate incidental).

RBLLC has not demonstrated any alleged contribution that RBLLC made to the Estate was substantial, and no award should be granted. RBLLC seeks compensation for formulating a plan and allegedly assisting in its confirmation, its efforts regarding financing and its work on settlements. RBLLC's true intent (i.e., that it was engaged in activities solely to protect its own interests) is apparent from its willingness to flip-flop on which plan it was willing to support until it received improved treatment under the OIC Plan. Moreover, RBLLC's actions with respect to financing were nothing more than efforts to protect its alleged security interest. Finally, RBLLC's efforts with respect to settlements were duplicative of the work of estate professionals and performed to protect what RBLLC believed to be its collateral. The work on behalf of RBLLC was performed to protect RBLLC's \$200 million claim and not intended to benefit the estate or other creditors. As such, no award for substantial contribution can be made. See Lebron, 27 F.3d at 944. Moreover, RBLLC does not meet or even approach the standard established by this Circuit in Cellular 101, and for the reasons which follow, its application must, therefore, be denied.

# B. <u>RBLLC Is Not Entitled to an Administrative Claim for Substantial Contribution</u>

1. RBLLC Cannot Justify a Substantial Contribution Award Relating to Work on the OIC Plan When It Also Vigorously Opposed Confirmation of the OIC Plan.

One of the three primary justifications for RBLLC's substantial contribution claim is its work on the OIC Plan. Interestingly, despite its attempt to take credit for the plan that was ultimately confirmed, RBLLC did not actually file or even support such a plan when it was filed by the OIC. Uncontested Facts at ¶ 46. RBLLC, at various times, changed its support between the OIC Plan and the plan being proposed by the Debtor in order to obtain the best treatment it could for its claim. While these are customary and legitimate actions for a creditor to take to protect its claim, they certainly do not provide a substantial contribution to the Estate. RBLLC's actions regarding the OIC Plan did more to hinder the progress of the Debtor's reorganization than to foster it, and therefore, the Debtor's Estate should not be forced to pay \$118,810.00 of RBLLC's legal fees incurred in such routine creditor actions as part of the plan process, especially where RBLLC played all sides to improve its position. See In re Sentinel, 404 B.R. at 499 (even if court found that the claimants actions amounted to a substantial contribution, the fees would have been denied in the face of the expense the claimant caused the plan proponents to incur as claimants voted against and fought confirmation of the plan); In re White Mountain Communities Hosp., Inc., 2007 WL 2004099, at \*1 (9th Cir. July 9, 2007) (denying application pursuant to section 503(b)(3)(D) where creditors actions "slowed the progress of reorganization"); In re Richton Intern. Corp., 15 B.R. 854, 856 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[s]ervices which substantially contribute to a case are those which foster and enhance, rather than retard or interrupt the progress of reorganization").

RBLLC engaged in conduct and took several positions that were counter-productive to the Debtor's reorganization and confirmation of the OIC Plan. For example, RBLLC flip-flopped between supporting the OIC Plan<sup>2</sup> and the plan proposed by the Debtor (depending on which plan

The fact that a chapter 11 trustee replaced RBLLC as a debtor-in-possession in RBLLC'S bankruptcy may be part of the reason for the conflicting strategies and positions. However, the net effect to the ML estate from RBLLC's actions throughout the bankruptcy did not provide a substantial contribution.

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gave it better treatment), as well as lodged a twenty-eight (28) page objection to the OIC Plan ("RBLLC Plan Objection") [Docket No. 1643]. *Uncontested Facts* at ¶¶ 46-48. RBLLC also filed three substantive motions that, if successful, would have derailed the efforts of the OIC to confirm a plan.<sup>3</sup> *Id.* at ¶ 49. RBLLC's ultimate treatment under the OIC Plan awarded RBLLC a premium over other creditors. The improved treatment under the OIC Plan is the reward RBLLC sought and obtained through its work relating to the various plans, but such efforts did not provide a corresponding benefit to the Debtor's Estate or other creditors sufficient to justify a substantial contribution award.

Moreover, even if RBLLC had made some contribution to the OIC Plan in the beginning of the bankruptcy case, which evidence is not clear given the involvement of multiple parties in the plan drafting process, RBLLC's sudden opposition to the Plan, beginning in January of 2009, completely overshadowed any early contribution. In *Sentinel*, the claimant seeking substantial contribution claimed to have provided many terms of the confirmed plan that provided benefits to creditors. *Sentinel*, 404 B.R. at 495-96. The *Sentinel* court found that there was no substantial contribution in the claimant providing beneficial terms for the plan but that, even if it had determined that the claimant's actions amounted to a substantial contribution, the award would be denied due to the expense caused by the claimant in fighting the plan confirmation process. RBLLC's switching sides and lodging the RBLLC Plan Objection created an increase in costs to the Estate with no corresponding benefit to anyone other than RBLLC.<sup>4</sup> RBLLC's only reward for

Although it bears the burden of proof, RBLLC offers nothing more than self-serving allegations of the costs it believes the OIC and the Debtor incurred in fighting the three substantive motions and two objections filed by RBLLC to thwart the OIC's efforts at reorganization. Completely lacking is any evidence from the OIC or its financial advisor to describe the costs to the estate of the time spent by the OIC fighting RBLLC's aggressive actions to derail the OIC Plan. Also lacking is evidence from the Debtor regarding the costs it incurred in pushing forward with its own plan of reorganization with the belief that it had the support of RBLLC only to have RBLLC abandon it for a better deal in the OIC Plan. This failure to produce evidence on the part of RBLLC is fatal to its application for an award of substantial contribution because it bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. *See Sedona Institute*, 2001 WL 1345985 at \*1.

The Court requested that RBLLC file a supplemental brief with case law supporting its position that the Court should look only to the benefit RBLLC provided to the early part of the OIC Plan process and should ignore the later efforts of RBLLC to fight confirmation of the OIC Plan. In RBLLC's Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Effect of Change of Management and Counsel on Application pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) and (4) for Allowance and Payment of Administrative Claim ("RBLLC Supplement"), RBLLC devotes 11 pages to restating its arguments but devotes only one sentence to the Court's request. In that one sentence, RBLLC concedes that it could find no case law to support its position regarding substantial contribution. *See* RBLLC Supplement at page 7.

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27 28 participating in plan matters when it ultimately objected to and fought confirmation of the OIC Plan should be its favorable treatment in the OIC Plan and nothing more.

RBLLC's actions are clearly distinguishable from the actions that led to a partial award to the claimant in the Cellular 101 case. In Cellular 101, the creditor seeking a substantial contribution award actually proposed the only plan of reorganization on its own while the debtor made no attempt to reorganize. Cellular 101, 377 F.3d at 1097. Moreover, in the proposed plan, the creditor waived its own prepetition claim and paid all other claimants in full. Id. RBLLC, on the other hand, did not act alone in any of its alleged contributions, negotiated for the best treatment it could obtain from two different plan proponents, did not propose its own plan, did not waive its claim but instead fought the OIC Plan until it received improved treatment for its own claim. Even the OIC – the entity that drafted the OIC Plan, proposed it with no other sponsor and fought successfully for confirmation over the objections of RBLLC and others - withdrew its request for substantial contribution from the Debtor's estate. Uncontested Facts at ¶ 29. If the OIC, who undisputedly did most of the work relating to confirming a plan in this case, recognized that it was not entitled to a substantial contribution award, clearly RBLLC is not entitled to such an award when it was, at best, one of many contributors to the first draft of the OIC Plan and then later fought its confirmation. The Bankruptcy Code encourages creditor involvement but cannot reward every creditor for its participation in the case without creating an insurmountable administrative burden on the Estate. Such a weakened substantial contribution standard suggested by RBLLC would foster such claims in every case in which creditors actively protect their own interests, drain debtors' estates and consume court resources in adjudicating the many claims that would be filed in every case. The Court must resist RBLLC's efforts to forge new ground in reducing the substantial contribution standard where, as here, the claimant was one of many creditors involved in the activities for which the creditor seeks to have its legal fees reimbursed by the estate. See In re D.W.G.K. Restaurants, 84 B.R. at 689-90 (numerous participants in the proceedings made similar contributions and extensive involvement is not sufficient to compel a substantial contribution award).

Throughout the Debtor's case, RBLLC's actions have been motivated only by its own self-

interest.<sup>5</sup> RBLLC admits that, "as a large unsecured creditor, [it] took actions to protect its own potential distributions ..." See RBLLC Administrative Claim at p. 10. While a certain level of self-interest is presumed and tolerated, RBLLC's self-interest was a hindrance to the Debtor's reorganization and must not be rewarded. Moreover, as RBLLC's self-interest was its primary motivation in the plan process, a substantial contribution award would not be proper. See Lebron, 27 F.3d at 944 (while some level of self-interest is expected from a creditor, the terms "substantial" requires that the benefit received by the estate must be more than an incidental one arising from activities that the applicant has pursued in protecting its own interests); Geriatrics Nursing Home, 195 B.R. at 38-39 (to succeed on a substantial contribution claim a creditor must demonstrate that its efforts transcended self protection, and a claim will be denied where claimant provided an actual and demonstrable benefit to creditors but acted primarily in its own interest in doing so); United States Lines, 103 B.R. at 430 (creditors face an especially difficult burden in passing the substantial contribution test because they are presumed to act primarily in their own interests). The legal fees incurred by a creditor monitoring a plan to ensure that it gets fair treatment are clearly not compensable from the Debtor's Estate. See In re Buttes, 112 B.R. at 195 ("[i]t is axiomatic that legal services provided solely for the benefit of a creditor or client are not compensable from the bankruptcy estate"); In re Jack Winter Apparel, Inc., 119 B.R. 629, 637 (E.D. Wisc. 1990) (section 503(b) "should not become a vehicle for reimbursing every creditor who elects to hire an attorney").

Instead, RBLLC's efforts to foster competition between the OIC and the Debtor in the development of competing plans and objections to the OIC Plan that were withdrawn when RBLLC's treatment was improved under the OIC Plan, reveal RBLLC's true agenda – it was acting to improve its own position and not concerned with the effect on the ML Estate of fostering

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RBLLC's concern regarding the Debtor's plan of reorganization was highlighted in its RBLLC Plan Objection in which it stated, "the Plan unfairly discriminates against Classes 7 and 11B, in which Radical Bunny is the sole claimant .... [t]he Plan violates Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(7) because Radical Bunny receives less under the Plan on account of its Class 7 and Class 11B claims than it would receive if the Debtor were to liquidate under Chapter 7." *See* RBLLC Plan Objection at p. 3.

RBLLC, the ML Estate received little or no corresponding benefit from the actions of RBLLC. Therefore, this Court cannot accept RBLLC's invitation to lower the substantial contribution standard to a point where creditors are rewarded for any action taken to protect their own claims where there may arguably be some incidental or inconsequential benefit to the bankruptcy estate. Despite filing several briefs on the issue over the past four months, RBLLC is unable to point to any clear and substantial benefit received by the ML estate from RBLLC's efforts to protect itself as part of the plan process for one reason – none exist.

2. RBLLC Cannot Justify a Substantial Contribution Award Relating to Alleged Preservation of Assets Where It Acted Primarily in Its Own Self-Interest and Duplicated the Efforts of Others.

RBLLC also seeks an extraordinary amount of compensation, \$356,253.00, for services which allegedly "preserved" the assets and value of the Debtor's Estate. However, despite numerous opportunities and the burden of proof, RBLLC fails to quantify how its actions preserved or increased the Debtor's Estate. As stated above, RBLLC must meet an extremely high burden in demonstrating that its actions were not performed primarily to protect its own interests. RBLLC's efforts to prevent the approval of financing that would jeopardize what it believed to be its collateral does not rise to the level of making a substantial contribution to the Estate – particularly when several other constituents were taking similar actions to object to the financing. Similarly, RBLLC's agreement to subordinate its claim at a time when its alleged security interest was being challenged, where the subordination would allow for funding to protect the collateral in which RBLLC claimed an interest, is nothing more than a means to protect RBLLC's interests. See Lebron, 27 F.3d at 944 (while some level of self-interest is expected from a creditor, the term "substantial" requires that the benefit received by the estate must be more than an incidental one arising from activities that the applicant has pursued in protecting its own interests); Geriatrics

Moreover, such additional and significant fees from RBLLC were not contemplated in the OIC Plan, the related budget or the exit financing.

The fact that RBLLC identified a possible lender to the ML estate that ultimately did not provide financing (*Uncontested Facts at*  $\P$  65) is irrelevant to an analysis of whether RBLLC made a substantial contribution to the Estate and has never been found to be sufficient to justify a substantial contribution award.

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Nursing Home, 195 B.R. at 38-39 (to succeed on a substantial contribution claim a creditor must demonstrate that its efforts transcended self protection, therefore claim will be denied where claimant provided an actual and demonstrable benefit to creditors but acted primarily in its own interest in doing so); *United States Lines*, 103 B.R. at 430 (creditors face an especially difficult burden in passing the substantial contribution test because they are presumed to act primarily in their own interests).

In support of its Administrative Claim, RBLLC asserts that it preserved the Debtor's assets by objecting to the initial post-petition financing terms, identifying alternative providers of postpetition financing and ensuring that estate assets were being used for the benefit of all creditors. Uncontested Facts at ¶ 63. Such assertions do not create the rare occasion where a claim for substantial contribution should be awarded, particularly as this work was duplicative of identical efforts made by several other Estate professionals. See In re D.W.G.K. Restaurants, 84 B.R. at 689-90; In re American Plumbing, 327 B.R. at 279 (conclusory statements from creditor regarding its alleged contributions are not sufficient). The burden is on RBLLC to prove that it provided services that benefited the Estate and were not duplicative. See American Plumbing, 327 B.R. at 281 (court must weigh benefits conferred upon the estate with the fees sought); In re Lease-A-Fleet, Inc., 148 B.R. 419, 429 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (substantial contribution not found where the fees sought exceed the benefits conferred); US Lines, 103 B.R. at 429 (administrative claim under 503(b) must be denied where creditor's services "would merely deplete the assets of an estate without providing a corresponding greater benefit") (emphasis added). Moreover, RBLLC must also demonstrate that such efforts were not simply motivated by its desire to protect its own alleged interests in the collateral being offered to secure the proposed financing. See Lebron, 27 F.3d at 944; Geriatrics Nursing Home, 195 B.R. at 38-39; United States Lines, 103 B.R. at 430.

RBLLC attempts to turn routine work performed on its own behalf and duplicated by many other creditors and the Debtor into a claim for providing a substantial contribution to the entire estate. Merely participating in the process to allegedly move the case forward and <u>assisting</u> in the resolution of certain issues along the way does not rise to the level of a substantial contribution. *Columbia Gas*, 224 B.R. at 548. By the same token, expected or routine activities in the guise of

extensive or active participation cannot establish substantial contribution. *American Plumbing*, 327 B.R. at 283. Allowing a substantial contribution award for RBLLC's actions in protecting what it believed to be its collateral would eliminate the "substantial" element from the analysis. *See id.* (allowing a substantial contribution award for playing a key role in the progress of resolving major issues in a large bankruptcy would essentially emasculate the "substantial" element from the standards of § 503(b)).

By duplicating the work of other professionals, RBLLC acted to protect its interests and caused an increase in costs to the Estate. Duplicating the tasks assigned to and being performed by ML and its professionals is *not* a substantial contribution to the Estate. *In re D.W.G.K. Restaurants*, 84 B.R. at 689-90. Additionally, RBLLC'S alleged good deeds should not be reviewed in a vacuum. If RBLLC's subsequent changes on plan support and objections to the OIC Plan ultimately cost the Estate additional fees and expenses, RBLLC did not provide a substantial contribution to the Estate. *See Sentinel*, 404 B.R. at 499 (even if court found that the claimants actions amounted to a substantial contribution, the fees would have been denied in the face of the expense the claimant caused the plan proponents to incur as claimants fought confirmation of the plan); *US Lines*, 103 B.R. at 429 (administrative claim under 503(b) must be denied where creditor's services "would merely deplete the assets of an estate without providing a corresponding greater benefit").

3. RBLLC Cannot Justify a Substantial Contribution Award Relating to the Debtor's Settlements with Borrowers Where It Acted Primarily in Its Own Self-Interest and Duplicated the Efforts of Others.

RBLLC seeks payment of \$97,882.50 in fees from the Debtor's Estate for its services relating to Debtor's settlement of claims with certain of the Debtor's borrowers. *Uncontested Facts* at ¶ 82. Once again, these services described by RBLLC were duplicative of the work of the OIC and others and, therefore, did not provide a substantial contribution. *See Uncontested Facts* at ¶¶ 83-85. Moreover, participating in a settlement process primarily to protect the RBLLC's own interests is not a substantial contribution and does not justify the payment of fees from the Estate. 8 *Columbia Gas*, 224 B.R. at 552.

RBLLC's actions were clearly duplicative of those taken by numerous other professionals, and RBLLC may not be compensated from the Debtor's estate for such duplicative services. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, DLA Piper LLP (US), Gust Rosenfeld, PLC, Mack Drucker & Watson, FTI Consulting, MCA Financial Group, Ltd., Fennemore Craig, PC, Alvarez & Marsal and Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, P.L.C., among others, were involved in the litigation and settlement of multiple lawsuits with borrowers. The OIC, on behalf of all investors, monitored the litigation and settlements and objected and negotiated where necessary. *Uncontested Facts* at ¶ 85. RBLLC duplicated the services already being performed by the OIC and others. *Id.* RBLLC should not be paid from the ML estate for work that was being performed by other Estate professionals, and no estate should be forced to compensate every creditor that participates in the bankruptcy process. *See In re D.W.G.K. Restaurants*, 84 B.R. at 689-90 (numerous participants in the proceedings made similar contributions and extensive involvement is not sufficient to compel a substantial contribution award).

RBLLC states that it will supplement the amount sought in the Application with the additional fees and costs incurred preparing the Administrative Claim, addressing any objections to the Application and appearing at the hearing on the Application. RBLLC's preparation of its Administrative Claim clearly does not provide a "substantial contribution" to the Debtors estate. *See In re US Lines*, 103 B.R. at 431 (the substantial contribution test does not permit an award for work done in connection with a fee application).

In Columbia Gas, the court noted that the substantial contribution claimant was involved in the settlement process because of its sizeable interest in the matter and the fact that the claimant was permitted to play a role in a matter in which it had significant interest did not provide a basis for finding a direct and material benefit to the estate. Columbia Gas, 224 B.R. at 552. The court also noted the role played by many others in the process further demonstrated that the substantial contribution claimant's efforts did not provide anything more than an incidental benefit to the estate. Id.

RBLLC did nothing more in the settlement process than protect its interests. Like the claimant in Columbia Gas, RBLLC invested time into the settlement process because it had its own interests to protect. Also, like the claimant in Columbia Gas, the work performed by RBLLC was performed by others, as well. RBLLC's actions do not rise to the rare and unusual level where an award for substantial contribution can be justified, and RBLLC's administrative claim for substantial contribution must be denied.

#### III. CONCLUSION

RBLLC received a premium in the OIC Plan as reward for its work on its own behalf throughout the bankruptcy. No additional reward is warranted. Moreover, RBLLC's actions were duplicative of the actions taken by others and, therefore, cannot be considered to have made a substantial contribution to the Debtor's case, and the actions that RBLLC took to oppose confirmation of the OIC Plan undercut and eliminated any benefit that it may have incidentally conferred upon ML. For all of the reasons stated above, the Liquidating Trust respectfully requests this Court to deny the substantial contribution Administrative Claims requested by RBLLC.

DATED this 12th day of November, 2009.

STRADLEY RONON STEVENS & YOUNG, LLP

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By: /s/ Mark J. Dorval Michael J. Cordone Mark J. Dorval Lead Counsel for Kevin T. O'Halloran, Trustee

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## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 12, 2009, I electronically transmitted the attached document to the Clerk's Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants:

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